Research Article | | Peer-Reviewed

Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools

Received: 10 July 2025     Accepted: 23 July 2025     Published: 2 September 2025
Views:       Downloads:
Abstract

The study explores Global South nations migration diplomacy as weapons and tools during sour-relationship. This study is relevant because of current ‘unprecedented’ refugee manipulation in the media ‘gives birth’ to examine the migration diplomacy weapons use by the Global South nations. Moreover, Global South migration research is understudied compared to the Global North migration. The article is built on migration diplomacy theory which explores tools such as coercion, leverage, restriction, repatriation, harassment, and cooperative migration diplomacy. The study draws from the Kenya’s case study, which is not geopolitically relevant or contiguous, or rentier refugee state but weak state employed coercion namely, deportability and harassment to achieve her goals. The study employs a literature review also known as a ‘meta study’. The study’s findings reveal that deportability, remittances sanction, and migrants’ accusation by political parties as cause of unemployment, and low living standards among citizens are adopted. Mostly, the intentions are directed to migrants but indirectly to sending states or international communities. The study further reveals Global South countries engage in migration diplomacy to be recognised and powerful, to improve credentials, moral standing and status. The study identified that the success and failure of migration diplomacy depends on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the country. A vulnerable country might comply and cooperate, whereas invulnerable country may not change policies. The study argues that Global South states may change their migration diplomacy cooperation to coercion and leverage through violence threatening in the unilateral decision to be recognised. Cooperative migration is achieved if the state realizes mutual benefits between countries through border opening for moral standings.

Published in Humanities and Social Sciences (Volume 13, Issue 5)
DOI 10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12
Page(s) 408-417
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Coercion, Deportability, Global South, Migration Diplomacy, Cooperative Migration

References
[1] Acharya, A. and Buzan, B., 2019. The making of global international relations. Cambridge University Press.
[2] Adamson, F. B., 2006. Crossing borders: International migration and national security. International Security 31(1): 165-199.
[3] Adamson, F. B. and Tsourapas, G., 2019. Migration diplomacy in world politics. International Studies Perspectives, 20(2), pp. 113-128.
[4] Adelman, H., and Abdi, A., 2003. How long is too long? Durable solutions for the Dadaab refugees. Report prepared for CARE Canada, Toronto: Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, 30 June.
[5] AFP, 2019. Kenya plans to close world’s biggest refugee camp Dadaab: Document. East African (Nairobi), 26 March. Available at:
[6] Anarfi, J., et al. 2003. Migration from and to Ghana: A background paper. University of Sussex: DRC on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty.
[7] Amnesty International., 2016. Nowhere else to go: Forced returns of Somali refugees from Dadaab Refugee Camp, Kenya. 15 November. Available at:
[8] Arreguin-Toft, I., 2005. How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict (Vol. 99). Cambridge University Press.
[9] Blue, S. A., 2010. Cuban medical internationalism: Domestic and international impacts. Journal of Latin American Geography, pp. 31-49.
[10] Brand, U. and Wissen, M., 2012. Global environmental politics and the imperial mode of living: articulations of state-capital relations in the multiple crises. Globalizations, 9(4), pp. 547-560.
[11] Castles, Stephen., 2014. TheAgeofMigration - International Population Movements in the Modern World, 5th ed. New York: The Guilford Press.
[12] Chung, S., 2020. Resistance and acceptance: Ambivalent attitudes toward the ageing body and antiaging practices among older Korean migrants living in New Zealand. Journal of Women and Aging, 32(3), pp. 259-278.
[13] Cornelius, W, A. and Rosenblum, M, R., 2005 Immigration and politics. Annual Review of Political Science 8(1): 99-119. De Genova NP (2002) Migrant ‘illegality’ and deportability in everyday life. Annual Review of Anthropology 31(1): 419-447.
[14] Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S., 2010. Xenophobia, international migration and development. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 11(2), pp. 209-228.
[15] De Genova, N, P., 2002. Migrant ‘illegality’ and deportability in everyday life. Annual Review of Anthropology 31(1): 419-447.
[16] Ellermann, A., 2009. States Against Migrants: Deportation in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[17] Fawat, I., 1985. Libya: Economic Crisis, Political Expulsions. AfricAsia, 22(1985), pp. 32-43.
[18] Fitzpatrick, M. P. 2015 Purging the Empire: Mass Expulsions in Germany, 1871-1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[19] Greenhill, K. 2010 Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[20] Haney, P. J. and Vanderbush, W., 2005. The Making of an Embargo. US-Cuban Relations, 1959-1980. P. Haney, & V. Walt, The Cuban Embargo: Domestic Politics Of American Foreign Policy, pp. 11-30.
[21] Hollifield, J. F., 1992. Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[22] Hufbauer, G. C., et al. 1990. Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (Vol. 1). Peterson Institute.
[23] Human Rights Watch., 2017. Pakistan coercion, UN complicity: The mass forced return of Afghan refugees. 13 February. Available at:
[24] İçduygu, A. and Üstübici, A., 2014 Negotiating mobility, debating borders: Migration diplomacy in Turkey-EU relations. In New border and citizenship politics (pp. 44-59). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
[25] Joppke, C., 1998. Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration. World Politics 50(2): 266-293.
[26] Kenya National Assembly., 2013. Report of the Joint Committee on Administration and National Security; and Defence and Foreign Relations, on the inquiry into the Westgate Mall terror attack, and other terrorist attacks in Mandera in North Eastern and Kilifi in the Coastal region. Available at:
[27] Keohane, Robert Owen. and Joseph S. Nye., 2012. Power and Interdependence, 4th ed. London: Longman policies in migration and border diplomacy. Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), pp. 1-22.
[28] Korsi, L., 2022. Do we go or do we stay? Drivers of migration from the Global South to the Global North. African Journal of Development Studies, 12(1), pp. 71-87.
[29] Liang, Z., 2016. China's great migration and the prospects of a more integrated society. Annual Review of Sociology, 42, pp. 451-471.
[30] Lohmann, J., et al. 2018. Wenn Staaten Migration (aus) nutzen. Über Exterritorialisierung und Akteurschaft in der strategischen Migrationspolitik. Z'Flucht. Zeitschrift für Flucht-und Flüchtlingsforschung, 2(1), pp. 108-127.
[31] Lori, N., 2019. Offshore Citizens. Cambridge University Press.
[32] Maharaj, B., 2010. Immigration to post-apartheid South Africa: Critical reflections. Immigration Worldwide: Policies, practices, and trends, 363.
[33] Malit Jr, F. T. and Tsourapas, G., 2021. Migration diplomacy in the Gulf-non-state actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 47(11), pp. 2556-2577.
[34] Martin, P. L., 1993. Migration and trade: The case of the Philippines.
[35] Masud, M. M. H., 2021. The International Community’s Influences on the Refugee Policies of African States: The Cases of Tanzania and Kenya (Doctoral dissertation, UNIVERSITY OF OLDENBURG).
[36] Micinski, N. R., 2018. Refugee policy as foreign policy: Iraqi and Afghan refugee resettlements to the United States. Refugee Survey Quarterly 20(3): 253-278.
[37] Micinski, N. R., 2021. Threats, deportability and aid: The politics of refugee rentier states and regional stability. Security Dialogue, p. 09670106211027464.
[38] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan., 2017. Emergency grant aid to Afghan refugee and host communities in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 24 February. Available at:
[39] Milner, J., 2009. Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
[40] Mitsilegas, V., 2006. Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU, The. Common Market L. Rev., 43, p. 1277.
[41] Muriithi, J. W., 2014. Effects of South Sudan instability on Kenyans economic and human security: a case study of Nairobi and Turkana counties (Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi).
[42] Najafizada, H. and Maroof, H., 2015. ‘Harassment’ drives Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
[43] Natter, K., 2018. Rethinking immigration policy theory beyond 'Western liberal democracies. Comparative migration studies, 6(1), pp. 1-21.
[44] Norman, K. P., 2020. Reluctant Reception: Refugees, Migration and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[45] Oyen, M., 2015. The Right of Return: Chinese displaced persons and the International Refugee Organization, 1947-56. Modern Asian Studies, 49(2), pp. 546-571.
[46] Refugee Consortium of Kenya., 2003. Refugee management in Kenya. Forced Migration Review 16: 17-19. Rosenberg D (forthcoming) Agents, structures, and the moral basis of deportability. Security Dialogue.
[47] Shah, N. M., 2012. Socio-demographic transitions among nationals of GCC countries: implications for migration and labour force trends. Migration and Development, 1(1), pp. 138-148.
[48] Thiollet, H., 2011. Migration as diplomacy: Labor migrants, refugees, and Arab regional politics in the oil-rich countries. International Labor and Working-Class History, 79(1), pp. 103-121.
[49] Thiollet, H., 2020. Unlocking migration politics: researching beyond biases and gaps in migration studies and comparative politics. In KNAW Academy Colloquium (pp. 115-125).
[50] Tsourapas, G., 2017. Migration diplomacy in the Global South: Cooperation, coercion and issue linkage in Gaddafi’s Libya. Third World Quarterly 38(10): 2367-2386.
[51] Tsourapas, G., 2019. The Syrian refugee crisis and foreign policy decision-making in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Journal of Global Security Studies 4(4): 464-481.
[52] Ulrichsen, K. C., 2020. Qatar and the Gulf crisis: A study of resilience. Oxford University Press, USA.
[53] Vandewalle, D., 2012. A history of modern Libya. Cambridge University Press.
[54] Vorvornator, L. K., 2024. Examining Migration Leverage and Coercion between Sending and Host Countries and their Success and Failure: The Global Perspective. African Renaissance (1744-2532), 21(2).
[55] Vorvornator, L. K., 2024. Exploring South Africa’s Pre and Post-apartheid Border System: Border Securitisation, Illegal Migration and Cross-border Crimes. Journal of African Foreign Affairs, 11(2), p. 123.
[56] Vorvornator, L. K. and Enaifoghe, A., 2024. South African migration policy on the Zimbabwean special permit renewal experience: Diplomacy of weapons for power. Journal of Law and Sustainable Development, 12(8), pp. e3514-e3514.
[57] Vorvornator, L. K. and Mdiniso, J. M., 2022. Drivers of corruption and its impact on Africa development: Critical reflections from a post-independence perspective. African Journal of Development Studies, 2022(si2), p. 295.
[58] Yeoh, B. S., et al. 1999. Migrant female domestic workers: debating the economic, social and political impacts in Singapore. International Migration Review, 33(1), pp. 114-136.
[59] Yin, R. K., 2017. Case study research and applications: Design and methods. Sage publications.
Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Vorvornator, L. (2025). Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools. Humanities and Social Sciences, 13(5), 408-417. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12

    Copy | Download

    ACS Style

    Vorvornator, L. Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools. Humanit. Soc. Sci. 2025, 13(5), 408-417. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12

    Copy | Download

    AMA Style

    Vorvornator L. Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools. Humanit Soc Sci. 2025;13(5):408-417. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12

    Copy | Download

  • @article{10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12,
      author = {Lawrence Vorvornator},
      title = {Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools
    },
      journal = {Humanities and Social Sciences},
      volume = {13},
      number = {5},
      pages = {408-417},
      doi = {10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hss.20251305.12},
      abstract = {The study explores Global South nations migration diplomacy as weapons and tools during sour-relationship. This study is relevant because of current ‘unprecedented’ refugee manipulation in the media ‘gives birth’ to examine the migration diplomacy weapons use by the Global South nations. Moreover, Global South migration research is understudied compared to the Global North migration. The article is built on migration diplomacy theory which explores tools such as coercion, leverage, restriction, repatriation, harassment, and cooperative migration diplomacy. The study draws from the Kenya’s case study, which is not geopolitically relevant or contiguous, or rentier refugee state but weak state employed coercion namely, deportability and harassment to achieve her goals. The study employs a literature review also known as a ‘meta study’. The study’s findings reveal that deportability, remittances sanction, and migrants’ accusation by political parties as cause of unemployment, and low living standards among citizens are adopted. Mostly, the intentions are directed to migrants but indirectly to sending states or international communities. The study further reveals Global South countries engage in migration diplomacy to be recognised and powerful, to improve credentials, moral standing and status. The study identified that the success and failure of migration diplomacy depends on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the country. A vulnerable country might comply and cooperate, whereas invulnerable country may not change policies. The study argues that Global South states may change their migration diplomacy cooperation to coercion and leverage through violence threatening in the unilateral decision to be recognised. Cooperative migration is achieved if the state realizes mutual benefits between countries through border opening for moral standings.
    },
     year = {2025}
    }
    

    Copy | Download

  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools
    
    AU  - Lawrence Vorvornator
    Y1  - 2025/09/02
    PY  - 2025
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12
    DO  - 10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12
    T2  - Humanities and Social Sciences
    JF  - Humanities and Social Sciences
    JO  - Humanities and Social Sciences
    SP  - 408
    EP  - 417
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2330-8184
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20251305.12
    AB  - The study explores Global South nations migration diplomacy as weapons and tools during sour-relationship. This study is relevant because of current ‘unprecedented’ refugee manipulation in the media ‘gives birth’ to examine the migration diplomacy weapons use by the Global South nations. Moreover, Global South migration research is understudied compared to the Global North migration. The article is built on migration diplomacy theory which explores tools such as coercion, leverage, restriction, repatriation, harassment, and cooperative migration diplomacy. The study draws from the Kenya’s case study, which is not geopolitically relevant or contiguous, or rentier refugee state but weak state employed coercion namely, deportability and harassment to achieve her goals. The study employs a literature review also known as a ‘meta study’. The study’s findings reveal that deportability, remittances sanction, and migrants’ accusation by political parties as cause of unemployment, and low living standards among citizens are adopted. Mostly, the intentions are directed to migrants but indirectly to sending states or international communities. The study further reveals Global South countries engage in migration diplomacy to be recognised and powerful, to improve credentials, moral standing and status. The study identified that the success and failure of migration diplomacy depends on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the country. A vulnerable country might comply and cooperate, whereas invulnerable country may not change policies. The study argues that Global South states may change their migration diplomacy cooperation to coercion and leverage through violence threatening in the unilateral decision to be recognised. Cooperative migration is achieved if the state realizes mutual benefits between countries through border opening for moral standings.
    
    VL  - 13
    IS  - 5
    ER  - 

    Copy | Download

Author Information
  • Sections